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I. INTRODUCTION
Human rights law presents a number of difficulties that seem to be
largely doctrinal in nature.1  Individuals naturally seek the best answers to
these difficulties.  This Article documents some of these difficulties, and 
suggests not so much answers, but what one might call a negotiational 
* © 2016 R. George Wright.  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University
Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 
1. See discussion infra Sections II–IV (considering the largely doctrinal nature of 
the approaches cited throughout this Article).
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approach to their resolution.2  The Article addresses the role of corporate 
liability, an increasingly important area of the law, particularly under the 
federal Alien Tort Statute,3 for major violations of the most fundamental 
human rights.4  Often, such cases involve a theory of corporate aiding and
abetting liability in connection with an underlying substantive human rights
violation.5 
A large number of contestable issues arise in such contexts.  Here is the
most typical approach: Assuming some theory of the nature of ordinary and
corporate persons, the aims of tort and criminal law, and the idea of fairness, 
one could seek to discover the doctrinally most appropriate particular sets of
legal requirements for a given kind of human rights case. Recognizing 
the complexity of this inquiry, one could apply some version of what are
technically called coherentist, holistic-molecular, or reflective equilibrium
approaches.6 One could thus tinker with the various judicial requirements
in human rights cases, until some optimum is reached, in the sense that any
further improvement in the overall judicial approach to the tort or crime under 
consideration would have to come at a supposedly excessive cost in some 
other aspect.  Thus, the goal would be to discover the supposed morally or
legally best approach to each aspect of the case.
The approach to corporate human rights recommended below seeks no 
such theoretical correctness or pragmatically appealing outcomes, but a 
hypothetically or actually negotiated accommodation in light of established 
and sensible priorities against broad background moral constraints.  Thus, the
aim is not to discover right or true answers to these various judicial questions,
nor to discover whether one legal requirement would be better or fairer 
than some alternative requirement.  Instead, within broad moral limits, the
emphasis is on outlining a casual, informal simulation of negotiating or
bargaining among parties affected by or interested in any possible form 
of corporate liability for human rights abuses.
No such simulated negotiation results in a uniquely unassailable outcome
or conclusion.  But proposing human rights liability rules to accommodate
realistic and reasonable interests and priorities of affected and interested
parties, including conscientious consumers, while avoiding outcomes may
 2. See id.; see also HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 66– 
77 (1982) (explaining a classic account of relevant problems and possibilities in such 
negotiations).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  This statute dates from 1789.  See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20 § 9 (b), 1 Stat. 73, 77; see also discussion infra Sections III–VI. 
4. See discussion infra Section III.
 5. See discussion infra Section V. 
6. See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text. 
580
WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018 2:53 PM      
  
    
 
 
   
  
 

















   
 
  




[VOL. 53: 579, 2016] Corporate Human Rights Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
involve a moral and jurisprudential travesty.7  Currently, binding human 
rights law can make no such guarantees. 
The key recommendation, based on a thought-experiment negotiation 
process, is for human rights advocates to seriously consider bargaining away
their preferred legal positionson corporate mens rea in tort cases,  punitive
damages recovery, standards of proof, the legal relevance of remedial 
measures, statutes of limitation, corporate criminal liability, and other 
mattersto obtain broad corporate acquiescence in realistically enforceable
corporate tort liability, particularly on an aiding and abetting theory, for 
at least the most egregious underlying human rights violations. 
Ideally, the concessions suggested above will someday no longer be
necessary. Presently, such concessions, along with the various non-
compulsory means encouraging corporate human rights compliance, might 
persuade major corporate enterprises that limited and genuine exposure to
human rights-oriented tort law is in the overall long-term corporate interest. 
Such a strategy might, thus, increase the overall meaningfulness and
impact of human rights law. 
In developing these themes, this Article first addresses, by way of
example, questions of mens rea, or required mental states, through the
basic purposes and relevant assumptions underlying general tort and criminal 
law.8  Whichever approach the law adopts, with or without negotiation, 
toward corporate aiding and abetting liability in human-rights-oriented
torts cases should at least be generally compatible with these basic purposes
and assumptions.  Next, this Article addresses several possible approaches
to the mens rea issues before adopting a model of negotiation or bargaining 
bounded by general moral constraints.9 
Secondly, this Article discusses a number of issues associated with the
Alien Tort StatuteATS10in case context.11  From the perspective of 
this statute and case law, the Article briefly considers issues of mens rea
in general and in context;12 criminal and tort intention, knowledge, and
 7. See infra Sections IV–VI. 
8. See infra Section II.
 9. See infra Sections III–IV.  For our purposes, a hypothetical or real negotiating 
process could involve a focus on statutory enactments and amendments, including possible 
amendments to the Alien Tort Statute. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
11. See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the eight judge dissent in Doe v.
Nestle, USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 946–956 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting), reh’g
denied).
12. See infra Sections III–IV. 
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foresight;13 multinational corporate, subsidiary, or contractual partner
liability;14 various forms of aiding and abetting or accessory liability;15 
and the scope of extraterritorial or distinctly foreign applicability of the 
ATS in egregious human rights cases.16  These considerations are then
synthesized in a brief concluding section.17 
II. SOME BASIC PURPOSES AND OTHER ASSUMPTIONS OF
 
TORT AND CRIMINAL LAW
 
Negotiating the various aspects of potential corporate human rights 
liability unavoidably takes place within certain general bounds.  In particular, 
such negotiating will likely reflect, at least generally, some reasonably 
widely accepted version of the purposes and other basic assumptions 
underlying tort and criminal liability.  Such underlying assumptions may 
structure, facilitate, and help legitimize the results of a hypothetical or 
actual bargaining process. 
Versions of retributive theory and of utilitarianism provide the most
prominent accounts of criminal law in general,18 and of criminal mens rea
requirements in particular.19  Scholars combine backward-looking retributive
theories and forward-looking utilitarian theories.20  Most notably, John
Rawls recommended a utilitarian approach at the broadest levels of criminal 
law theory, but a retributive approach to applying criminal law in
particular cases.21 
Other writers seek to add distinct alternatives to the basic categories of 
retribution and utilitarianism.  Thus, some think of criminal law as 
communicative, expressive, or vindictive of community norms, values,
 13. See infra Section IV.
 14. See infra Section V.A. 
15. See infra Section V.B.
 16. See infra Section V.C.
 17. See infra Section VI.
 18. See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role
of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 639–40. 
19. See id.  Retributive theories consider criminal punishment as logically fitting or
as called for and deserved, whereas utilitarian views tend to think in terms of maximizing 
overall utility or welfare across some population and time frame, with the punishment
itself considered as a loss of welfare.  Utilitarian theories of punishment are forms of the 
broader category of consequentialism.  See Hugo Adam Bedau & Erin Kelly, Punishment, 
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/ [https://perma.cc/
4P6N-X727] (last updated July 31, 2015). 
20. See Bedau & Kelly, supra note 19. 
21. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 5 (1955). 
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and sentiments.22  Others voice concern for offender incapacitation,23 
rehabilitation,24 and moral education.25  Yet others refer to the value of societal
preservation,26 or, more parochially, to the expiation of sin.27 The Supreme
Court suggested that a mens rea requirement in a statute, apart from any
appropriate strict liability cases, “alleviate[s] vagueness concerns,” “narrow[s]
the scope of [its] prohibition[,] and limit[s] prosecutorial discretion.”28 
The purposes of the criminal law in general, and criminal mens rea
requirements in particular, suggest that mens rea requirements should 
somehow serve the public and its values, without unfairly sacrificing the 
criminal defendant on the altar of possible utility gains.  Thus, the question
of whether a defendant deserves some level of punishment, or any
punishment at all, should not be casually set aside.29  This will remain as 
long as we distinguish different degrees of culpability among, for example, 
involuntary acts, innocent and eminently defensible choices, momentarily 
careless choices, knowledgeable choices, and strategically calculated
deliberation, even if each choice results in the same harmful outcome.30
 22. See, e.g., Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/68T3-2T68] (last updated
May 13, 2013). It seems evident that tort law can involve communicative or socially expressive 
elements as well.
 23. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1, 11 (2003) (discussing early U.S. crime control’s emphasis on 
incapacitation and deterrence).
24. See id. at 1–21 (discussing rehabilitation efforts to provide prisoners with the 
ability to contribute to society).
25. See id. at 1 n.1. 
26. See Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept 
of Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 364 (1966). 
27. See id.
28. McFadden v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2298, 2307 (2015) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 149, 150 (2007)). 
29. See, e.g., Winnie Chan & A.P. Simester, Four Functions of Mens Rea, 70
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 381, 384 (2011) (“[Mens rea] helps to establish the moral innocence or 
guilt of the defendant’s conduct . . . .”). 
30. For a discussion of knowing versus intent mens rea, see Elonis v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2001, 2010 (2015) (“When interpreting federal criminal statutes that are silent 
on the required mental state, we read into the statute ‘only that mens rea which is necessary
to separate wrongful conduct from “otherwise innocent conduct.”’” (quoting Carter v.
United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000))).  For a classic treatment of statutory criminal 
mens rea cases, see generally J. LL. J. EDWARDS, 8 MENS REA IN STATUTORY OFFENCES
(L. Radzinowicz ed., 1955).  For a broad American, and in particular a Uniform Penal
Code focus, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 252–318 (5th ed. 2010). For
stimulating theoretical discussion of criminal mens rea issues, see LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS
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Similar constraints on state of mind requirements arise in the context of 
civil tort liability. These similarities arise, however, despite more demanding 
mens rea requirements in criminal cases, as opposed to lower levels of
blame, fault, culpability, responsibility, and stigma involved in civil tort 
cases.31  Thus, contemporary tort law hosts partially competing theories 
of its purposes, including compensation, enterprise liability, economic 
deterrence and wealth maximization, social justice, and individual justice.32 
One could further multiply the possible legitimizing and constraining 
purposes of tort law.33  On any reasonable such listing, however, a sense
of meaningful justice and of vindication for innocent victims of severe 
harms would play a significant role.34  This value is obviously relevant in
contexts of basic human rights violations. 
AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 165–209 (1987); Larry
Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 931, 931 (2000) (explaining purpose and knowledge mens rea as reducible to a
recklessness mens rea in the sense of a contextually insufficient concern for the interests
of other persons); Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on Alexander’s 
Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 955, 955–56 (2000) (responding
to and critiquing Alexander, supra); Stephen J. Morse, Inevitable Mens Rea, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 51, 51 (2003) (discussing the mens rea requirements as indispensable as
long as criminal defendants are thought of as rational actors rather than as mechanical 
objects); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1020 (1932) (“It is 
hopeless to find any general universal concept of mens rea applicable to all . . . crimes
alike.”); Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463, 464 (1992) 
(distinguishing the mens rea significance of culpable belief states of mind and of culpable
desire states of mind, as well as culpably negligent conduct); see generally Findlay Stark, 
It’s Only Words: On Meaning and Mens Rea, 72 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 155 (2013) (arguing for the
communicative value and the judicial discretion-reducing value of uniform definitions of
mens rea terms). 
31. See Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 533, 533 
(2000) (explaining that while an actor’s intent is often crucial in personal responsibility-
focused criminal cases, tort law often focuses on negligence or strict liability, given the 
special tort law concern for injured victims, actual and prospective); Edward Sankowski,
Two Forms of Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. TOPICS 123, 124 (1990) (suggesting strict 
tort liability as responsibility without blameworthiness, fault, or culpability).  See also John
C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility, in  PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 18 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (explaining tort law as 
involving “civil recourse” and a concern for “victims’ demands for responsive action” in
tort law cases).
32. See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 514
(2003).  For a similar inventory of purposes or justifications of tort law, see Stephen R.
Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1992) (noting the
possibility of combined theories).
33. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort Law, 22 VAL.
U. L. REV. 643, 645 n.23 (1988) (summarizing the ten goals of tort law listed in Robert F. 
Blomquist, Goals, Means, and Problems for Modern Tort Law: A Reply to Professor
Priest, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 621, 629–34 & 634 n.50 (1988)). 
34. See sources cited supra notes 31–33. 
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For those interested in increasing the efficacy of human rights law over 
time, it seems relevant to consider the process values associated with well-
functioning tort law regimes.  In this respect, tort law systems should offer 
genuine effectiveness, routine compliance, and the enforceability of sensible 
procedural requirements as well as fair substantive judicial outcomes.35 
Similar compliance and enforceability issues are a matter of vital concern
in the context of human rights law.36 
In particular, any approach to the various contestable issues in human 
rights-oriented tort contexts would presumably draw upon at least one, if
not several, of basic aims and constraints of tort law.  Ultimately, one 
might choose to seek some genuinely right overall theory of each of the
contestable issues in human rights contexts.  The various answers to each
question would, in theory, fit together in such a way as to jointly contribute
to the sense that the other answers are also right. 
As a loose analogy, consider a crossword puzzle.37  A solver’s confidence 
in the correctness of the completed grid reflects several considerations, as
well as their holistic interaction.  A particular answer must be neither a 
letter too long nor a letter too short. Answers must in some sense cohere
with one another. By themselves, and even jointly, though, these considerations 
cannot maximize confidence in the correctness of one’s pattern of grid 
entries. Instead, one could start from the clues provided, seeking, without
regard to the grid, what seemed a correct or crossword-sound answer, in 
response to the clue. Confidence reaches its maximum only when the
grid-based tests yield outcomes that cohere well with the clue-based tests.
One could, in principle, pursue correct answers to human rights torts
problems through vaguely similar methods.  In several areas of philosophical
inquiry, such an inquiry is known as coherentism.38  One might construe 
35. See sources cited supra note 33. 
36. See ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 69–70 (2014) 
(explaining the skepticism, or realism, manifested by scholars regarding compliance with
international human rights treaties).
37. See SUSAN HAACK, EVIDENCE AND INQUIRY: TOWARDS RECONSTRUCTION IN
EPISTEMOLOGY 81–82 (1993). Professor Haack, admittedly, does not intend this example
to suggest a pure coherentism. See id.
38. Coherentism is the name given to several philosophical theories within modern 
epistemology, or the study of knowledge.  For more detailed discussions of coherentism, 
see Robert Audi, Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Epistemological Dogmatism, 2 PHIL.
PERSPECTIVES 407, 407–08 (1988); Laurence Bonjour, The Coherence Theory of Empirical 
Knowledge, 30 PHIL. STUD. 281, 281–82 (1976); Keith Lehrer, Coherence, Justification,
and Chisholm, 2 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 125 (1988); Nicholas Rescher, Foundationalism, 
Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization, 71 J. PHIL. 695, 695, 703 (1974). 
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coherentism as a form of a broader class of approaches under the rubric 
of holism,39 or, in our case, more precisely, molecularism.40  One of the
best known variants thereof is the “[wide] reflective equilibrium” technique 
endorsed by John Rawls.41 
Borrowing some of the most basic techniques associated with these
schools, this Article aspires not to perpetually debate moral or legal 
correctness, but to advance plausible and defensible accommodations for 
enforceable human rights.  The goal is to arrive at several meaningful 
concessions to multinational corporate actors that might purchase greater
corporate acquiescence in an enforceable regime of corporate tort liability
for at least egregious human rights violations under typical circumstances.
Concessions could be made, in the course of broad hypothetical bargaining, 
in exchange for a jurisprudential regime that respects the basic rights of 
such corporate defendants, while reducing, in several respects, the risk of 
human rights travesties.  The idea of a human rights travesty refers to the 
most egregious human rights violations, with some degree of direct or
indirect corporate involvement, where those violations are, in practice, left 
unremedied in any forum.  The necessary concessions, along with other 
important considerations—including increasing multinational corporate 
sensitivity to public perceptions of corporate complicity in human rights 
violations—are intended to open the door to meaningful, if in some respects 
limited, corporate human rights tort liability.  Such a development would 
39. “Holism” takes on a variety of meanings in different contexts. See, e.g., Ned 
Block, An Argument for Holism, 95 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 151, 151 (1995)
(discussing differing definitions of meaning holism); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Holistic
Culpability, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2523–24 (2007) (explaining individual mental 
state concepts versus overall blameworthiness within the criminal law context). For an
example of holism about units of meaning, see James O. Young, Holism and Meaning, 37 
ERKENNTNIS 309, 309–11 (1992).  For an example of holism and the locus of value, see
Campbell Brown, Two Kinds of Holism About Values, 57 PHIL. Q. 456, 456–59 (2007). 
For important historical forms and debates, see A.W. Price, Aristotle’s Ethical Holism, 89 
MIND 338 (1980); Timothy Shiel, On Marx’s Holism, 4 HIST. PHIL. Q. 235 (1987). 
40. See Henry Jackman, Meaning Holism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning-holism/ [https://perma.cc/F5SB-VQ37] (last updated 
Sept. 15, 2014) (explaining the meaning of a word is inescapably linked to the meanings 
of a very limited number of other, related words).  To pursue the physics analogy, though,
holism is often contrasted with atomism. See id.; Brown, supra note 39, at 456; Michael 
Esfeld, Holism and Analytic Philosophy, 107 MIND 365, 365 (1998). 
41. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 20–21, 48–50 (1971).  For commentary,
see Jon Mikhail, Rawls’ Concept of Reflective Equilibrium and its Original Function in A 
Theory of Justice, 3 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1, 5–26 (2010).  For a somewhat broader focus, 
see Norman Daniels, Reflective Equilibrium, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/ [https://perma.cc/BJ48-YFB6] (last updated 
Jan. 12, 2011) (explaining reflective equilibrium as a matter of seeking coherence among 
our beliefs); see also R.B. Brandt, The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium, 
100 ETHICS 259, 260–78 (1990). 
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promote, generally, the practical meaningfulness of the evolving system 
of international human rights law.
III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE MENS REA PROBLEM
The curious history and continuing complications of the Alien Tort 
Statute have been widely documented.42  The Alien Tort Statute, enacted 
as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789,43 declares with deceptive simplicity 
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or 
a treaty of the United States.”44  This Article leaves a number of issues to 
judicial resolution or to statutory amendment, including who counts as an
alien, the law of nations, separation of powers issues, which mens rea or 
mental states required, comity and the division of responsibility between
domestic and international law, the range of possible defendants, corporate
and accomplice liability, the scope of geographical application of the 
statute, the relevance of other laws and fora, the nature and limits of
recoveries available for successful plaintiffs, and possible exhaustion
requirements.45 
In the course of his academic discussion of the subject, Justice Stephen 
Breyer refers to the ATS as “a statute that helps to protect basic human
rights.”46 As to the broader project of protecting such rights, Justice
Breyer declared: “The citizens of most nations believe that goal to be 
important.  They also believe that the rule of law is necessary to achieve
 42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  For valuable complementary discussions, see, for
example, STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 134–64 (2015); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES 17–26 (2008); Beth Stephens, The Curious History of the Alien Tort 
Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467 (2014) (highlighting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)).
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
44. Id.
45. A number of these issues and related uncertainties are touched upon in BREYER, 
supra note 42, at 134–64.  A reasonably instructive analogy might be drawn, in this respect, 
between the ATS and the similarly terse formulation of broad civil rights liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, under which a number of evidently basic issues must be judicially
addressed. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) 
(holding that an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if he or she can establish as a matter of
law that a reasonable officer under the same circumstances could believe the search complied
with the Fourth Amendment). 
46. BREYER, supra note 42, at 134. 
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it.”47 In this sense, broad public expectations regarding key legal instruments
such as the Alien Tort Statute seem high. 
The idea of a hypothetical negotiating process in the context of 
implementing, interpreting, and reforming the ATS can be introduced
through, merely for example, the recent case of Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc.
(Nestle II).48  In Nestle II, the Ninth Circuit addressed several issues, including 
those of corporate mens rea in the context of alleged tortious aiding and 
abetting of underlying basic human rights violations, allegedly perpetrated 
directly by parties with whom the ATS defendants had contractual
relationships.49 
The plaintiffs in Nestle II were “alleged former child slaves of Malian
descent, dragooned from their homes and forced to work as slaves on 
cocoa plantations in the Ivory Coast.”50  The corporate tort defendants were
not themselves accused of the underlying enslavement, human trafficking, 
or child slave labor practices, but of accessory liability thereto.51  The  
Ninth Circuit did not address in Nestle whether pursuing any tort or 
criminal action against any of those accused of enslavement, human
trafficking, or child slave labor would have been futile.52 
One question in Nestle II was whether aiding and abetting tort liability
requires a showing of Nestle’s purpose or intent to further or facilitate the 
underlying human rights violations, or a showing of Nestle’s knowledge, 
at some relevant time, of such violations.53  If the Ninth Circuit determined 
that accessory liability under the ATS requires purpose or intent rather
than mere knowledge, the court would reach the question of what sorts of 
corporate activities, beliefs, desires, values, or dispositions suffice to
show the relevant purpose or intent.54 
In Nestle II, the appellate majority recognized that two other federal
circuits have adopted a purpose or intent rather than a knowledge mens
 47. Id.
48. 788 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nestle II) (Bea, J., dissenting) (rejecting the 
majority’s denial of rehearing en banc, as joined by seven other Ninth Circuit judges).  The 
denial leaves intact the panel opinion in Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.
2014) (Nestle I). The corporate defendants in this case, beyond Nestle at the level indicated, 
also included fellow multinationals Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill, Inc., and Cargill
Cocoa. Nestle II, 766 F.3d at 946 [hereinafter the multinational corporate defendants
in this and similar cases will be referred to below as Nestle].
49. See Nestle II, 788 F.3d at 948 (Bea, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc).
50. Id. at 947. 
51. See id.
 52. See id.
 53. See id. at 948–49 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
54. See id. at 949. 
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rea requirement.55 However, the panel majority determined that it need not 
decide between these two mens rea requirements under the circumstances,56 
as “the plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy the more stringent purpose standard,57 
and therefore state a claim for aiding and abetting slavery.”58 
The dissenters in Nestle II rejected the applicability of a knowledge 
mens rea requirement,59 as well as the panel holding that the plaintiffs had 
alleged facts legally sufficient to establish purpose or intent on the part of
the defendants.60  According to the dissenters, the assertion that the defendants
sought or intended to increase their profits through a production process 
involving child slavery, among other actions, did not amount to a sufficient
allegation of the defendant’s intent.61 
The dissenters further observed that beyond asserting the defendants’
quest for greater rather than lesser profits, “the plaintiffs . . . do not even 
allege that the defendants could not have procured similar prices from the
Ivorian plantations absent their use of slave labor––by technological
innovations or the exercise of monopsony power, for instance.”62 It is
unclear whether the dissenters would, in such contexts, impose a pleading 
and production burden showing that a profit-motivated corporation obtained
greater overall profits, over some time frame, through contractual relationships 
fulfilled by child slave labor rather than through other legally permissible 
and practical alternative production process.  Any such inquiry would of 
course be highly speculative, if not arbitrary.63 
By contrast, the majority focused less on cost comparisons, or on any 
likelihood of greater profits or reduced costs through alternative approaches
to cocoa production. The majority conceded the lack of any intent on the
part of the defendants to harm children as an intent or purpose for its own 
55. Nestle I, 766 F.3d 1013, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2014) (first citing Aziz v. Alcolac, 
Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2011); and then Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 583 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009)).
56. Id. at 1024. 
57. We here ignore the interesting possibility that in some circumstances, a knowledge 
mens rea requirement might actually be more rigorous, or more genuinely inculpatory and
indicative of more serious responsibility, than a purpose or intent mens rea requirement.
58. Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1024. 
59. Nestle II, 788 F.3d at 951 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
60. See id. at 951. 
61. See id. at 950. 
62. See id. at 950–51, 950 n.11. 
63. It seems possible, for example, that requiring greater mechanization of the cocoa
production process could be prohibitively costly over the short term, gradually more competitive 
over some longer time frame, and profit-enhancing over some yet longer period.
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sake.64  The majority then conceded that an ordinary intentional business 
relationship does not meet the aiding and abetting intent mens rea
requirement,65 as presumably in the case of a lessor’s profitably renting a
car that is later used in a bank holdup.66  Thus, 
Doing business with child slave owners, however morally reprehensible that may
be, does not by itself demonstrate a purpose to support child slavery.  Here, 
however, the defendants allegedly intended to support the use of child slavery as 
a means of reducing their production costs.  In doing so, the defendants sought a
legitimate goal, profit, through illegitimate means, support of child slavery.67 
The majority, thus, emphasized the distinction between seeking or 
intending some state of affairs as an end in itself, or for its own sake, and 
intending a state of affairs largely, or indeed entirely, as a means68––perhaps
sincerely regretted––to some desired goal.69 
More broadly, the Nestle II case raises a number of contentious issues.
These include, among others, the question of private corporate aiding and
abetting tort liability under the ATS;70 related issues of the level of descriptive
generality to be employed in determining whether corporate behavior 
violates specific consensual international legal prohibitions;71 and further
related questions as to the possible extraterritorial reach, in these and other 
contexts, of the Alien Tort Statute.72 
From our perspective, though, it is important not to lose focus on the 
nature and moral gravity of the phenomenon of child slavery, as well as 
64. Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1025. 
65. See id.
 66. See discussion infra Section V.B.
 67. Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1025–26 (emphasis added). 
68. See discussion infra Section IV.
 69. See Nestle I, 766 F.3d at 1025–26. 
70. See Nestle II, 788 F.3d at 954 (Bea, J., dissenting); see also Amanda
Humphreville, Comment, If the Question Is Chocolate-Related, the Answer Is Always Yes: 
Why Doe v. Nestle Reopens the Door for Corporate Liability of U.S. Corporations Under 
the Alien Tort Statute, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 191 (2015); see also discussion infra Section V. 
71. See Nestle II, 788 F.3d at 951 (Bea, J., dissenting).  For background on issues 
of the appropriate level of generality at which rules, rights, and other phenomena should 
be described, see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the 
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1057–1108 (1990). See also Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 n.7 (1991) (discussing the dispute over relatively narrow and
broad descriptions of rights between Justices Scalia and Brennan); John F. Manning, 
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 2003 (2009). 
72. See Nestle II, 788 F.3d at 952 (Bea, J., dissenting).  The key questions in this 
respect focus on the proper interpretation of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. Ct. 
1659, 1669 (2013), which raised the possibility of rebutting a presumption against 
extraterritorial application of the ATS by showing that the claim touches and concerns the
territory and interests of the United States with sufficient force, as well as Kiobel’s
relationship to Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 264–73 (2010). 
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the currently limited number, availability, and scope of genuinely effective 
judicial mechanisms for redressing such depredations.73  It might be said
that all recognized human rights count as, in some sense, fundamental. 
But it is also difficult to believe that ratifiers of human rights treaties would 
be indifferent as among the violation of any two of their many enumerated
human rights.74  Child slavery is morally distinctive.  Allowing proper 
scope for cultural and historical relativism still leaves us with the distinctive 
egregiousness of contemporary child slavery, however common such practices
may be.75 
Nor should the Alien Tort Statute hamstring courts into applying 
complex and largely unresolvable inquiries into whether child slavery is,
under a given set of circumstances, genuinely profitable, or more profitable
than some alternative production process.  The debates over the economics 
of nineteenth century chattel slavery continue today,76 but such debates 
are irrelevant to this Article’s concerns. Differences in largely hypothetical
productivity levels do not mitigate an abomination. 
73. For example, the United Kingdom enacted criminal penalties to persons who 
engage in slavery, servitude, forced or compulsory labor, and human trafficking under the 
British Modern Slavery Act of 2015.  British Modern Slavery Act 2015, 63 Eliz. 2, http://
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/30/contents/enacted/data.htm [https://perma.cc/2UBN­
4XBQ] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
74. For a sophisticated discussion of lists of human rights, see JACK DONNELLY,
UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Cornell Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2013). 
75. See Child Slavery, ANTI-SLAVERY, http://www.antislavery.org/english/slavery_today/
child_slavery/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/4BA7-GTEH] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016); Stories
of Child Slavery, ANTI-SLAVERY, http://www.antislavery.org/english/slavery_today/child_ 
slavery/stories_of_child_slavery.aspx [https://perma.cc/JJA7-CXJ4] (last visited Aug. 2, 
2016) (describing anecdotal accounts of contemporary child slavery).  For a sense of the 
complications and variations of the institution of slavery in international commodity production
supply chains, see Slavery in the Global Supply Chain, ANTI-SLAVERY, http://www.antislavery.
org/english/slavery_today/slavery_and_what_we_buy/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/37JS­
6TV5] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016).  For controversial background allegations on some selected
participants in and narrow segments of the cocoa and chocolate production sector in particular, 
see Child Labor and Slavery in the Chocolate Industry, FOOD EMPOWERMENT PROJECT, www. 
foodispower.org/slavery-chocolate [https://perma.cc/ K2HN-NNNC] (last visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
76. See ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS 4– 
5 (1989 ed.) (1974) (explaining traditional interpretation of slavery economics is contradicted 
by advances in economics, math, and statistics); HERBERT G. GUTMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
NUMBERS GAME: A CRITIQUE OF TIME ON THE CROSS 84–85 (1975) (rejecting a number of
the Fogel & Engerman arguments). See, e.g., C.W. & A.J.K.D., Did Slavery Make Economic 
Sense?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 27, 2013, 3:37 PM) http://www.economist.com/node/21586949
[https://perma.cc/YMQ8-JKJR] (explaining several conflicting theories either supporting 
or critiquing the ideas of Fogel & Engerman).
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Thus, even if a court, for corporate mens rea purposes, took a position 
on the genuine profitability over some time frame of child slavery, such a 
determination might not meaningfully bear on the relevant issues.  The 
court and the corporate defendant may have different time frames in mind. 
For example, a corporate defendant might predict that child slavery is the 
most profitable option, but is mistaken in that regard, if only because of
adverse publicity or an ATS lawsuit.  The meaningful risk of ATS aiding
and abetting liability might also inspire a corporation to explore non-child 
slavery options, including the training of some number of workers to
operate and maintain agricultural machinery.
Differences in the costs of various cocoa and other commodity production 
methods may, in some cases, be minimal by comparison with other
components of the cost of finished retail products, especially given the
price elasticity of the demand for chocolate,77 and the potential effects of 
adverse publicity on corporate image.78  Especially in such cases, the risk
of meaningful ATS litigation might well encourage a corporate defendant 
to insist on non-slavery practices by those with whom it directly or indirectly
contracts.
Ultimately, though, human rights advocates should be willing to accept,
in negotiations, a mens rea requirement of intent, in exchange for corporate
concessions that should be of greater concern to the human rights community. 
Listed below are some justifications for this recommendation through
exploring relationships between intending some outcome as an end or as a
means, and desiring, foreseeing, or knowing of that outcome. 




When choosing to solve issues of mens rea on the merits, or to somehow 
bargain or negotiate, as this Article recommends—one needs some sense
of the meaning and scope of intention and related concepts.  Particularly 
for those seeking right answers on the merits, the problems are daunting: 
Controversy persists concerning the relationship between intention, desire and
foresight of consequences; between intending something, wanting it and realizing
that my action will or might bring it about: does intention involve a ‘desire’ for
 77. See, e.g., Price Elasticity of Demand, ECON. ONLINE, www.economicsonline.co.uk/
Competitive_markets/price_elasticity_of_demand/ [https://perma.cc/WVF6-G5G8] (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2016). 
78. Note the arguably significant and perhaps increasing concern on the part of some
multinational corporations for their public image as socially responsible global actors. See
discussion infra Section VI.
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that which is intended; does an agent intend what she foresees as the certain, 
probable or likely consequences of her actions?79 
Some of the important issues can be raised hypothetically.  Professor 
Ferzan asked: “The sniper who shoots at a soldier, thereby heating the barrel
of his gun––does he intend to alert the enemy of his presence?  When an 
actor knows the result is certain does the actor also intend that result?”80 
Should the answer always turn on whether the result is motivationally
significant for the actor?81 
While the ordinary scope of the idea of intention may not always
correspond with tort or criminal law usages, claims as to ordinary contexts
may be provocative.  Anthony Kenny, for example, suggested: “Feeling
miserable, I may deliberately get drunk.  In doing so, I foresee that I will
have a hangover; but I do not get drunk in order to have a hangover or 
with the intention of bringing on a hangover.”82  In a more positive mood,
and with somewhat different aims, a person might “imbibe a good deal of 
wine with the intention of enjoying a pleasant evening with a friend; he 
foresees he will get drunk and intends enjoying the evening and getting 
drunk.”83  Or, to elaborate upon Professor Ferzan’s hypothetical above,84 
consider an assassin who “intends to kill the Prime Minister by shooting 
her with a rifle from ambush.”85  Such an assassin: 
[F]oresees that this will make a loud noise, heat the barrel of the rifle, and cause 
the Prime Minister to fall out of her seat.  We would normally suppose the assassin
intends pulling the trigger, and the shooting and killing of the Prime Minister,
without necessarily intending the loud noise, the heating of the barrel of the gun, 
or the Prime Minister’s fall from her seat.86
 79. R.A. DUFF, INTENTION, AGENCY, AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY: PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 15 (1990) (focusing on criminal as distinct from civil tort liability). 
80.  Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1149– 
50 (2008).
81. See id. at 1150.  Alternatively, one might ask whether a particular consequence 
was or was not part of an actor’s “chain of reasons for acting.” MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING
BLAME 450–51 (1997). 
82.  Anthony Kenny, Intention and Purpose, 63 J. PHIL. 642, 644 (1966). 
83.  Joseph M. Boyne & Thomas D. Sullivan, The Diffusiveness of Intention Principle:
A Counter-Example, 31 PHIL. STUD. 357, 357 (1976). 
84. See Ferzan, supra note 80, at 1149–50. 
85. Gilbert Harman, Rational Action and the Extent of Intentions, 9 SOC. THEORY
& PRAC. 123, 123 (1983). 
86. Id.
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The scope of one’s intentions, or of intended outcomes, is often expanded, 
however, beyond these limits. Professor Duff, for example, recognized “a
broader notion of intention which includes foresight of morally certain— 
and perhaps even of probable—consequences,”87 with unclear application 
to the criminal law.88  Professor Duff sought to distinguish between
“intending an effect”89 and “bringing [that effect] about intentionally.”90 
Such a distinction draws upon Jeremy Bentham’s classic notion of an 
oblique intention,91 under which at least some foreseen and probable
consequences can count as intended even under the criminal law.92 The
philosopher Henry Sidgwick later took up this understanding of intention.93 
Professor Sidgwick argued in this fashion: 
Suppose a nihilist blows up a railway train containing an emperor and other
persons: it will no doubt be held correct to say simply that his intention was to
kill the emperor; but it would be thought absurd to say that he ‘did not intend’ to
kill the other persons, though he may have had no desire to kill them and may
have regarded their death as a lamentable incident in the execution of his
revolutionary plans.94 
On such a view, a criminal defendant is taken to have intended all of
the consequences of the defendant’s acts that the defendant foresaw and
believed to be “certain or probable.”95 
This broader understanding of the scope of intended consequences may
result from what might be thought of as a “working backwards.”  Often, 
determining whether a tort or criminal defendant at least partly intended a
particular result dictates how legally or morally responsible that defendant 
was for that result.  Professor Sidgwick may, in contrast, begin at the other 
end, with the conclusion that the defendant was legally or morally responsible 
for the result.  Assuming the defendant’s responsibility for that result, and 
their inability to “evade responsibility,” we can perhaps then infer, for
 87. DUFF, supra note 79, at 89. 
88. See id.
 89. R.A. Duff, Intentions Legal and Philosophical, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 76, 
78 (1989).
90. Id.
 91. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION ch. VIII, at 86 (Hafner ed., 1970) (1789). 
92. See id.  One would imagine that whatever might count as an intention for 
criminal law purposes would count at least as clearly as an intention for most civil tort law
purposes. On the other hand, distinctive stigma or disgrace may attach to a tortious human 
rights violation, even though aiding and abetting.
93. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 202 (Hackett 1981) (1874). 
94. Id. at 202 n.1. 
95. Id. at 202.  But see Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 905, 911 (1939) (“As far as actual intention is concerned, more is required than an 
expectation that the consequence is likely to result from the act”).  However, a “desire” is 
not always required for intention. Id. at 911. 
594
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pragmatic and moral reasons, that the defendant can be held to have 
intended the result.96  Very roughly, one might infer the defendant’s intent
from a sense of the defendant’s responsibility.  Other theorists have discussed
this broader sense of intention.97 
A somewhat different perspective suggests that the main reason the law 
focuses on intention or lack of intention is because frequently unlawful
results that are intended are more likely to occur than unlawful results that
are unintended.98  If harm is more likely to occur if it is intended, then the 
law has a reason to specially sanction the intent to bring about such a result.99 
But if a result of an action is certain to occur whether that result is intended
or not, we have, at least in this respect, no practical reason to choose one
theory of intention over another.100 
Again, the real strength of any or all of these arguments is something 
that, for our purposes, we can afford to bypass in the process of a negotiated 
agreement on even the strongest intent-based mens rea requirement or 
other concessions to potential defendants, in exchange for corporate human
rights law concessions on what human rights advocates might consider more 
practically important and fundamental matters.  In exchange for legitimizing
the availability of a limited multinational corporate aiding and abetting 
liability for grave human rights violations wherever the corporate influence
extends, concessions on mens rea and other matters are worth making.
Part of the motivation for a human rights advocate’s willingness to
endorse a strong mens rea requirement reflects the above contesting views 
as to how to define intention or how to distinguish intention from mere 
knowledge.101 There is also the murkiness and unpredictability of applying 
such distinctions in practice. Thus, the practical difference between mens
rea standards may not be consistently large. 
96. See SIDGWICK, supra note 93, at 202. 
97. See, e.g., Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 417, 419
(1987) (“A result that is either witnessed or foreseen as certain is almost always regarded 
as sharing the intentional nature of the act where it is either the contemporaneous
[concurrent] result or the immediate consequence of the act.”).  This holds whether one 
desired, regretted, or regarded with indifference the result in question, as in the case of a
defendant who quite sincerely cared only about getting paid. See id. at 438. 
98. See Kenny, supra note 82, at 650.  Professor Kenny recognizes the basic legal 
presumption “that a man intends the natural consequences of his acts,” and that one can
intend both ends and means, thus “[a] man intends the ends he sets himself and the means
he adopts to those ends.” Id. at 642, 648. 
99. See id. at 650. 
100. See id. at 651. 
101. See discussion supra notes 79–89 and accompanying text. 
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Consider, for example, the application of the sophisticated approach by
Professor John Finnis. Finnis concluded that: “What one intends is what 
one chooses, whether as end or as means.  Included in one’s intention
is everything which is part of one’s plan [proposal], whether as purpose 
or as way of effecting one’s purpose[s]everything which is part of one’s 
reason for behaving as one does.”102 Let us simply take the idea of intending 
something as a means to another goal, as opposed to seeking something 
for its own sake, or as an end in itself. Even so, many of us do not believe 
that invariably, our conscious choices reflect a reasonably clear plan or
proposal.  We may not know our own actual motives especially well.  Nor 
may all of our arguably relevant reasons for acting be clear and uncontestable,
even in retrospect. 
More broadly, all parties should recognize that no negotiated legal gain 
or loss on issues of intent and mens rea can be invariably and entirely 
secure. At the most basic level, there are “different ways of describing what 
somebody does: in killing X, for example, I may also be shooting X, pulling 
a trigger, and moving my finger.”103 The most morally or legally appropriate
descriptions may in some cases be contestable.  And while it may be that
“every action is intentional under some description,”104 multiple descriptions
may in some cases be in play, and an actor may be aware of arguably relevant 
circumstances on some descriptions but not others.105  Consider the simple
case of what one expects to be a painful, indeed dreadful, experience at the
dentist: as one intentionally walks into the office, and intentionally keeps 
the appointment, what other events or experiences are within the scope of 
one’s intentionsor plans, proposals, or reasons?106 
Additionally, the Knobe Effect, a psychological or otherwise empirical 
generalization holding that “a person’s intuitions as to whether or not a 
given side-effect was produced ‘intentionally’ can be influenced by that 
person’s attitude toward the specific side-effect in question,” must be accounted 
for.107 The persons thus influenced by their own attitudes in judging matters 
102. John Finnis, Intention in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW 229 (David G. Owen ed., 1997). 
103.  A.P. Simester, Paradigm Intention, 11 L. & PHIL. 235, 236 (1992). 
104. Ferzan, supra note 80, at 1149. 
105. See id; see also RICHARD R. NISBETT, MINDWARE: TOOLS FOR SMART THINKING
4 (2015); THOMAS GILOVICH & LEE ROSS, THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM 43 (2015).
106. See Arthur R. Miller, Wanting, Intending and Knowing What One Is Doing, 40 
PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 334, 338 n.7 (1980).  At the potentially quite misleading
level of wants or desires, many such patients may report that all they wanted, desired, or 
cared about was the prompt alleviation of pre-existing, or other pain. See id. 
107. Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63
ANALYSIS 190, 191 (2003). 
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of intentionality may presumably include, to one degree or another, judges 
and jurors in some corporate human rights tort cases.
One final complication in the realm of the intentional is contributed by 
any relevant lack of clarity and predictability in the application of what is 
called the Principle of Double Effect.108  The Principle of Double Effect
holds that “sometimes it is permissible to cause a harm as a [‘proportionate’
and unintended] side effect . . . of bringing about a good result even though it
would not be permissible to [presumably intentionally] cause such a harm
as a means to bringing about the same good end.”109  The literature and 
the relevant complications that follow are substantial.110  One related problem,
further diluting the human rights costs of any concession in the area of a
required mens rea, involves “the difficulty of distinguishing between grave 
harms that are regretfully intended as part of the agent’s means and grave
harms that are regretfully foreseen as side effects of the agent’s means.”111 
In the general human rights context, no major contemporary multinational 
corporation desires the practice of slave or child labor for its own sake, by
its own agents, its subsidiaries and suppliers, or by any entity with which 
it maintains direct or indirect contractual relations.  But wanting or not
wanting something for its own sake, whatever that murky idea may include, 
hardly exhausts the realm of intention. Leading corporate actors, or the
corporation itself, may demonstrably prefer one level of costs, or one level of
 108. Alison McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect [https://perma.cc/N9R9-45PR] (last updated
Sept. 23, 2014). 
109. Id.
110. For a mere fragment of the double effect literature, focusing in large part on
issues of intention and foresight, see T.A. CAVANAUGH, DOUBLE-EFFECT REASONING:
DOING GOOD AND AVOIDING EVIL (2006); ALAN DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY
157–64 (1977); JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 88, 90 (1977) 
(noting in particular “the difficulty of deciding where to draw the line between an act and 
its consequences.”); THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A
CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE (P.A. Woodward ed., 2001) (see in particular the 
respective contributions of Professors Anscombe, Bennett, Boyle and Nagel); SUZANE
UNIACKE, THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT IN PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 263 
(R.E. Ashcroft et al., eds., 2007); Antony Duff, Intention, Responsibility and Double Effect, 32 
PHIL. Q. 1, 5 (1982) (“The criteria of intentional agency and responsibility for an effect 
involve the agent’s knowledge of and control over that effect, but also its significance as 
providing a reason for or against his action . . . .”). 
111. McIntyre, supra note 108; see also Megha Bahree, Child Labor, FORBES (Feb.
29, 2008, 3:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/global/2008/0310/062.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4XD8-FPHH] (explaining that the race to the bottom is forcing farmers and manufacturers
to rely upon child labor).
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profitability, over another.  And, in rare cases, evidence may demonstrate,
however tentatively, that corporate actors believed slavery or child labor to
be, at some point in the production process, a likely means to more desirable 
cost or profit levels. 
It might well be, in some cases, that a corporate actor feels vaguely
forced to adopt such a means of production in the context of a cost-cutting 
“race to the bottom” among competitors.112  However self-defeating and 
undesired such a race to the bottom may be, it may still involve intentional 
actions.113  The best solution to the race to the bottom problem may be some 
form of credible, uniformly threatened legal or judicial sanctions.114 
In general, even if the legal mens rea standard requires a showing of 
intent, the judicial inquiry into intent may overlap substantially with an 
inquiry into what the corporation or its directing agents believed, foresaw,
or actually knew, as production processes evolved over time.  The differences,
in such contexts, between an intentional and a less-than-intentional mens
rea may often be modest, if not debatable or illusory, and readily negotiated
away by human rights advocates.
112. For a brief definition of the race to the bottom, see Race to the Bottom, FIN. TIMES, 
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=race-to-the-bottom [https://perma.cc/2KYU-6TUT] (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2016).
113. For an interesting illustration at the level of competing states, rather than
corporate actors, see the insightful majority opinion by Justice Cardozo in the state and 
federal unemployment compensation case of Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548
(1937). For discussion at the level of enforced labor standards in globalized production
markets, see, for example, R.A., Racing to the Bottom, ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE (Nov.
27, 2013 5:12 PM), www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/11/1abour-standards 
[https://perma.cc/JWL5-W4RD] (scroll to bottom of page; then go to page 2 to find this
posting). See also  RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND  LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER:
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 12 (2014) (noting collective action 
problems even among reputation- or image-conscious brands). 
114. The basic logic of a credible and broadly imposed, or at least broadly threatened,
regime of legal sanctions in such “collective action” dilemma situations was classically
suggested by THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN chs. 13–18 (Richard Tuck, ed.) (rev. ed., 1996)
(1651).  A narrower gauge solution to such collective action problems is endorsed by
Justice Cardozo. Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 596–97; see also RUSSELL L. HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (discussing the ways in which people act together when
confronted with actual collective action problems and analyzing the ways in which their actions 
do not conform with various theories about how people would act in these situations). 
598
WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018 2:53 PM      
  
    
 








   
 



















      






   
   
  
[VOL. 53: 579, 2016] Corporate Human Rights Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY OF MEANINGFUL 





A. Corporate Human Rights Liability
There appears to be some possibility, whatever the current or future 
setbacks and reverses, of meaningful corporate business liability in otherwise
appropriate cases under the Alien Tort Statute or some alternative vehicle.
Whatever the human rights liability of state actors,115 or authorized individual
persons acting on behalf of a corporation,116 the availability of corporate
115. For a sense of the current binding international law’s emphasis on state liability, 
as distinguished from corporate business liability, see, for example, John Ruggie (Special 
Representative), Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31
(Mar. 21, 2011); Draft Resolution, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23,
2014) (elaborating on the state versus corporation division regarding legal liability). See 
also John Gerard Ruggie, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2013); John G. Ruggie, Closing Plenary Remarks, UN Forum on Business &
Human Rights Issues 12 (Jan. 27, 2015).  For additional valuable perspectives, see Steven
R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE
L.J. 443 (2001); Gwynne Skinner, Parent Company Liability: Ensuring Justice for Human 
Rights Violations, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 2015), http://icar.ngo/
wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICAR-Parent-Company-Accountability-Project-Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SH3M-MRW8]; Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale & Olivier De 
Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by
Transnational Business, INT’L CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY ROUNDTABLE 12 (Dec. 2013), 
http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/The-Third-Pillar-Access-to-Judicial-Remedies-
for-Human-Rights-Violation-by-Transnational-Business.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ACV-VT7V];
John Tasioulas, Human Rights, No Dogmas: The UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, JAMESG.STEWART (Jan. 30, 2015) http://jamesgstewart.com/human-rights-no­
dogmas-the-un-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/627T­
UDH3].
In some human rights cases, the boundaries as to moral and causal responsibility between
government and corporate actors may be far from clear. Historically, see ADAM HOCHSCHILD,
KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST (1999); I.G. Farben, HOLOCAUST EDUC. & ARCHIVE RESEARCH
TEAM, http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/economics/igfarben.html [https://perma.cc/BK5P- 
ZME4] (last visited Aug. 4, 2016), and the commentary in Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s 
Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials’ Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S.
Courts Under the Alien Tort Statute, 70 ALBANY L. REV. 327 (2008). See also Edmund F. 
Byrne, In Lieu of a Sovereignty Shield, Multinational Corporations Should Be Responsible 
for the Harm They Cause, 124 J. BUS. ETHICS 609, 609 (2014). 
116. For some advantages of pursuing individual liability of persons acting on behalf
of a corporation, as distinct from corporate institutional liability, see Pammela Q. Saunders,
Rethinking Corporate Human Rights Accountability, 89 TUL. L. REV. 603 (2015). 
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tort liability under the ATS, in some cases, remains an important priority, 
rather than a negotiating point conceded by human rights advocates. 
This Article assumes that there is some minimum colorable argument 
for possible institutional or corporate liability under at least a revised version 
of the ATS.117 Despite some judicial intimations to the contrary,118 it has
been argued that “[c]ustomary, as opposed to treaty-based, international law
has never recognized the imposition of direct duties on private corporations.”119 
There will often be an additional dimension of doubt as to the existence 
of a custom and the scope of customary law, whether international or not.
For example, there will be cases in which observers can reasonably differ 
as to whether enough persons have walked a diagonal across the lawn to
create a path.  Thus, one or two cases of walking ordinarily do not establish a
path; more generally, one cannot specify any determinate number of cases 
that would suffice to establish a path, or by analogy for a custom, but one 
fewer than which would not.120 
There is also a level-of-generality problem in describing the relevant 
customary international law.  The more specificity used to describe the 
vital relevant circumstances, the less likely one finds any number of cases
of judicial recognition thereof. A specific characterization of any set of 
circumstances may distinguish certain features, while others may not have 
struck equally reasonable judges as particularly relevant.
In the present context, we would have to decide whether the most
relevant question is: at one extreme, whether somehow sufficiently well-
established customary international law condemns slavery or child slavery, 
or another extreme, whether such well-established customary international 
law condemns child slavery by corporate entities or by a defendant’s corporate 
subsidiaries in particular relationships of extraterritoriality.  Some independent 
theory must be adopted in order to justify choosing one broad or narrow 
description over another.121  In at least some human rights cases, avoiding 
what we might call a serious moral travesty would seem to be one useful 
and attractive option. 
117. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–19 (7th
Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (citing a number of cases, many of which assume, rather than
explicitly hold for, possible corporate liability under the ATS); see also In re South African 
Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).  But see Julian S. Ku, The Curious 
Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial 
Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353, 355 (2011) (“[T]he view that corporations can be liable 
for violations of customary international law under the ATS is wrong.”).
118.  See the cases cited in Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017–19. 
119. Ku, supra note 117, at 355. 
120. For a technical discussion of problems of this general form, see Dominic Hyde, 
Sorites Paradox, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sorites­
paradox [https://perma.cc/MGP2-BR7M] (last updated Dec. 6, 2011). 
121. See id.
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Particularly under United States law, the rights and liabilities of corporate
persons and of human persons crucially overlap.122  As well, in matters such
as slavery and involuntary servitude, the availability of a remedy does not 
depend on a showing of state action or action under color of state law.123 
More generally, corporations can have a relevant mens rea.124 Corporations
can, for example, intend to speak; know what they are saying; and even speak 
recklessly or negligently, as in the case of a hasty corporate website posting.125 
Thus, one might well wonder whether human rights advocates should 
continue to rely exclusively on non-binding corporate social responsibility 
rather than on a combination of such techniques with some form of binding
tort or criminal law.126  Some multinational corporations may be sensitive
to image-damaging publicity, perhaps involving their subsidiaries and
suppliers, in the press and via social media.  But not all multinationals 
currently have even internal policies regarding human rights.127  Well-
intended corporations, or their subsidiaries and suppliers, may be drawn
into a human-rights-damaging race to the bottom with regard to labor
practices.128  Local or host country judicial accountability, in practice, for
 122. See, for example, the controversial case of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 
310 (2010).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 943 (1988); see also Akhil 
Reed Amar & Daniel Wildavsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response 
to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1368 (1992); George Rutherglen, State Action, Private 
Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1371, 1391 (2008). 
124. See, e.g., V.S. Khana, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The 
Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355, 357–58 (1999). 
125. See id. at 357–58 in the context of corporate political speech, as in Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
126. For discussion on corporate responsibility, see Anita Ramasastry, Corporate
Social Responsibility Versus Business and Human Rights: Bridging the Gap Between 
Responsibility and Accountability, 14 J. HUM. RTS. 237 (2015).  Note in particular that 
even the classic argument of Milton Friedman requires corporate compliance with the
binding legal rules against force and fraud.  See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), http://umich.edu/
~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP4R-EJD4] (“[A] corporate executive . . . 
has [a] responsibility to his employers . . . to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom.”).
127. See Susan Ariel Aaronson & Ian Higham, “Re-Righting Business”: John Ruggie
and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards for Transnational 
Firms, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 333, 360 (2013). 
128. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text; see also Elisa Giuliani & Chiara 
Macchi, Multinational Corporations’ Economic and Human Rights Impacts On Developing 
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even basic human rights violations may be limited, especially in areas in
transition toward a general rule of law, thereby unfortunately reducing the 
local costs of non-compliance.129 
Additionally, there may actually be genuine legal risks, at this point, in 
a corporation’s adoption of any internal corporate policies regarding
human rights.  Such policies may have genuine public relations or image-
enhancement value.  But especially in an evolving legal environment, courts 
might use such well-intended policies against the adopting corporation as 
some evidence of its awareness of a problem, of its realistic ability to
address such problems, or of its acknowledgement of a duty to prevent or
minimize serious harms.130  In the Alien Tort Statute context, human rights
advocates could endorse a clarification of the law in this regard, and could 
at this juncture reasonably make concessions in this area, in exchange for
a more clearly binding general corporate legal obligation.
B. Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability 
In many, if not most, potential corporate human rights violation cases
under the ATS, the corporate liability alleged may take some form of
complicity, accomplice, accessory, or aiding and abetting liability. The 
sheer number of foreign affiliates, subsidiaries, and contracting parties 
associated with multinational corporations suggests the significance of 
some form of aiding and abetting liability.131 
Given the numbers, and the significance of various sorts of corporate 
affiliates, the human rights advocate’s negotiations should prioritize the 
realistic availability of aiding and abetting liability, in appropriate cases, 
Countries: A Review and Research Agenda, 38 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 479, 500 (2014) (noting
the possibility of “searching for efficiency gains [in some sense] by abusing human rights”). 
129. See Giuliani & Macchi, supra note 128, at 500.  See also POSNER, supra note 36, at
42–43. 
130. See, e.g., Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage, 737 P.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (Colo. 1987) 
(en banc) (“Although evidence of a broker’s violation of a custom or internal rule adopted 
for the protection of its customers does not automatically establish liability, a court may 
consider the custom or rule in a case-by-case determination of whether the broker breached 
a fiduciary duty to the customer.” (citing authority, including WILLIAM PROSSER, PROSSER 
& KEETON ON TORTS § 33, at 196 (5th ed. 1984))).  But see, e.g., Young v. Forgas, 720
N.E.2d 360, 369 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (an agency’s own “[i]nternal rules and procedures . . . 
do not impose a legal duty upon municipal entities and their employees.” (citations
omitted)).  Negotiations could also involve the inadmissibility of post-incident corporate 
actions taken to reduce the risk of future incidents. 
131. It is reported that as of 2009, 82,000 transnational corporations had 810,000 
foreign affiliates, with exports by those affiliates purportedly accounting for a third of all 
goods and services exports world-wide. See Danielle Olson, Corporate Complicity in
Human Rights Violations Under International Criminal Law, 1 DEPAUL INT’L HUM. RTS. 
L.J. 1, 1 (2015). 
602
WRIGHT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018 2:53 PM      
  
























   
 
    
   
 
   
    
  
[VOL. 53: 579, 2016] Corporate Human Rights Liability
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
within ATS tort law contexts.132  One may reasonably assume that whatever
problems of fairness, stigma, and utility may typically arise by imposing 
criminal liability on aiding and abetting conduct, such problems are at least 
no worse under arguably less severe ATS and other civil tort law rules. 
In hypothetical or actual negotiations, human rights advocates are currently 
on defensible ground in requiring a meaningful realm of tortious aiding
and abetting liability.  The recent ATS cases are often in some measure
accommodating of at least some minimal, narrow, restrictive form and 
degree of corporate aiding and abetting liability.133 
Under criminal law, it has long been held that a defendant who aids and
abets an underlying criminal act is, or may be held, responsible for the 
crime as the underlying perpetrator.134  The main problem in such criminal 
law cases is setting an appropriate mens rea requirement in aiding and 
abetting cases, and criminal law has tended to splinter over such questions. 
Thus, some criminal law courts require a showing of the defendant’s purpose 
or intention to facilitate the underlying offense in order for aiding and 
abetting liability to attach.135 
An immediate problem, however, is addressing the complexity of the 
idea of intention in such cases.  One could have an intention to aid the
principal, but, as noted above, at any level of generality.  Or one could intend
to aid the principal in the principal’s acting, or in acting as the principal 
chose or might have chosen to act.  Or most narrowly and rigorously, one
might intend to aid the principal precisely in the principal’s violation of 
the law. But what difference in mens rea exists between intending to aid
132. Aiding and abetting liability is often discussed in criminal, as opposed to civil 
tort law, contexts. 
133. See, e.g., Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2015); Aziz 
v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 390–91 (4th Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2009); Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009). 
134. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9–11 (1954); Nye & Nissen v.
United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618–19 (1949); Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 164
(1947).  See also HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 129 (1976) (discussing the abandonment of distinct criminal
culpability levels for principals and accessories).
135. See Balintulo, 796 F.3d at 170 (for an example in the ATS civil tort context);
Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192–94 (2d Cir. 2014); Talisman, 582 F.3d at 
247–48; Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 396 (2007); Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element Analysis
in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 
738–39 (1983). 
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a violation of law, and continuing to aid what one consciously knows to 
be an ongoing violation of law?136 
Beyond these considerations, some criminal courts have predictably
further confused matters by allowing liability based upon a showing of the
aider’s pecuniary interest;137 inference of intent under particular specified
circumstances;138 mere, but relevant, knowledge;139 a doctrinal slide from
a knowledge standard into one of mere recklessness;140 or, as currently 
recommended by some for the human rights context, aiding and abetting 
liability based on mere negligence.141 Finally, we could also allow the mens 
rea for aiding and abetting in the human rights context to track the mens
rea requirements for one or more, if not all, of the elements of the 
underlying human rights offense of which the principal actor is, or might 
be, accused.142 
At this point, we might conceivably choose to strike off in search of 
some technically correct or best solution to the various problems of mens 
rea in corporate aiding and abetting cases under the ATS, or in search of
some less purely theoretical but more pragmatically attractive approach.143 
Such a theory may focus on corporate condonation,144 accountability,145 
or a corporation’s somehow identifying itself with the underlying action.146 
This theory should seek to correctly classify corporations that were only
 136. See, e.g., Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1248–49 (2014) (“[A] 
person aids and abets a crime when . . . he intends to facilitate that offense’s commission . . . .
We have . . . previously found that intent requirement satisfied when a person actively
participates in a criminal venture with full knowledge of the circumstances[.]”).  For a
discussion of this uncertainty, see Kit Kinports, Rosemond, Mens Rea, and the Elements
of Complicity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 170 (2015); see also United States v. Robinson,
799 F.3d 196, 200–01 (2d Cir. 2015). 
137. See, e.g., Louis Westerfield, The Mens Rea Requirement of Accomplice Liability in
American Criminal Law–Knowledge or Intent, 51 MISS. L.J. 155, 161 (1980). 
138. See id.
 139. See id.; James G. Stewart, Complicity, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW
534, 551 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Homle eds., 2014). 
140. See Stewart, supra note 139, at 557. 
141. See James G. Stewart, Assoc. Professor, Univ. B.C. Peter A. Allard Sch. of Law,
Address at the American Society of International Law Annual Conference, Complicity in
Business and Human Rights (Apr. 9, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2676192 [https://perma.cc/HPE6-2EFG]; see also James Stewart, What Is the ICC’s 
Standard for Complicity Really?, JAMES G. STEWART (Dec. 4, 2014), http://jamesgstewart.com/
what-is-the-iccs-standard-for-aiding-and-abetting-really/ [https:// perma.cc/92SA-BJYF].
142. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 139, at 550. 
143. See MARION SMILEY, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BOUNDARIES OF COMMUNITY:
POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 255 (1992). 
144. See Alexander F. Sarch, Condoning the Crime: The Elusive Mens Rea for Complicity, 
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 131, 136 (2015). 
145. See Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 355 (1985). 
146. See id.
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in it for the money, and neither knew nor cared about anything else as distinct 
from mercenary cases.147 
Taking this path would involve confronting the more or less insoluble
doctrinal problems bypassed in connection with accomplice mens rea, and
mens rea in criminal and tort contexts generally.148  There is no reason to 
reinstate these perpetual doctrinal difficulties in the context of corporate
aiding and abetting liability in the ATS cases.  Given the various doctrinal 
slides and overlaps between intent and knowledge in one context or another,149 
such as the related issues of the availability of punitive damages,150 or 
perhaps even of individual personal actor liability,151 human rights activists
should make sensible concessions.  At least over the short term, activists 
should genuinely legitimize the idea and the institution of corporate human
rights liability in tort, and establish the principle of corporate aiding and
abetting liability under some version of the ATS. 
C. Extraterritoriality Concerns 
Finally, there may at some point be room for meaningful negotiation
among interested parties on the proper extraterritorial scope and application
of the ATS.152 Extraterritoriality under the ATS is motivated primarily by 
realistic concerns that some of the most grievous human rights violations 
might otherwise have no forum for meaningful redress.153  But limitations
147. Presumably, neither all taxi drivers nor all Uber drivers would also be classified 
as, in the traditional argot, “wheel men.”
148. For a survey of the more or less doctrinally unresolvable issues, see supra
Section IV.
 149. See supra Section IV. 
150. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 816–17
(S.D. Ind. 2010), aff’d on other grounds, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011); GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 58–65 (2008). 
151. See, e.g., Flomo, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (noting a possible tradeoff between
maximizing the incentives of individual actors to avoid violations and the presumably
crucial availability of far more substantial corporate assetsincluding corporate reputation
where the corporation is a possible defendant). 
152. This negotiation’s results could again be conceivably reflected in statutory
amendments.
 153. See Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel & Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: On the Supreme 
Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 601, 620 (2013).  See also Ernest A. 
Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-Law
Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1125 (2015) (quoting Wuerth, supra, at 620).  
For the realistic irrelevance of some national legal systems, see Jernej Letnar Cermic,
Corporate Accountability for Human Rights: From a Top-Down to a Bottom-Up Approach, in
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on the extraterritorial scope of the ATS reflect, most fundamentally, a 
sense of possible unfairness, imprudence, and inefficacy in adjudicating 
matters with little direct connection to American parties and interests.154 
At least for the moment, the extraterritorial application of the ATS is 
limited, pursuant to the case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.155 
Taken as a whole, Kiobel can be interpreted to hold that while there is a 
presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATS where the
parties and actions are largely foreign,156 there is a possibility that such a
presumption can be overcome when, in the classic language of property
covenant law, “the claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption.”157 
It remains to be seen or bargained over, whether the notoriety, scale, 
gravity, and otherwise unredressable nature of a human rights violation 
arguably traceable in part to action by a United States corporation could 
sufficiently touch and concern the territory, the global public image, and 
the diplomatic and foreign policy interests of the United States to justify 
extraterritorial application of the ATS.158  Any legal test involving this
obviously complex and abstract sufficiency must be largely indeterminate 
THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS LANDSCAPE: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK 193,
215 (Jena Martin & Karen E. Bravo eds., 2016).  At a minimum, corporate mobility can
make host country civil or criminal liability difficult to impose.  See, e.g., Beth Stephens, 
The Curious History of the Alien Tort Statute, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1521 (2014). 




See Wuerth, supra note 153, at 620; Young, supra note 153, at 1125. 
 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
See id. at 1669. 
157. Id.
158. For judicial interpretation of Kiobel, see Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 
Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791, 796–97 (2d Cir. 2014); Adhikari v. Daoud
& Partners, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1017–20 (S.D. Tex. 2015); Doe v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 66 
F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1244–46 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
Among the commentaries, the most authoritative is STEPHEN BREYER, Opening the 
Courthouse Door: The Alien Tort Statute and Human Rights, in  THE COURT AND THE
WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 134 (2015), followed by
influential Second Circuit Judge Pierre N. Leval, Beyond Kiobel: The Future of Human
Rights Litigation in US Courts, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 1 (2015).  See also Doug
Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme Court Leaves 
the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014); Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Evidence 
of Things Not Seen: Divining Balancing Factors From Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” 
Test, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 443 (2015); Anna Grear & Burns H. Weston, The Betrayal of 
Human Rights and the Urgency of Universal Corporate Accountability: Reflections on a 
Post-Kiobel Landscape, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21 (2015); Robert McCorquodale, Waving
Not Drowning: Kiobel Outside the United States, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 846 (2013); Ralph
G. Steinhardt, Kiobel and the Weakening of Precedent: A Long Walk for A Short Drink, 
107 AM. J. INT’L L. 841 (2013); Fernando R. Tesón, The Kiobel Decision: The End of an 
Era, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 161 (2013); Peter Weiss, ATS Lives: Al Shimari Survives
Kiobel, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 19 (2015). 
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until authoritatively clarified.  One alternative way to clarify the scope of 
Kiobel extraterritoriality is through actual or hypothetical negotiation by 
representatives of affected parties.  Human rights advocates should be
willing to consider trading off the ideal breadth of extraterritoriality, at 
least over the short term, if necessary to extend ATS coverage to American 
corporate involvement in the most egregious, notorious, and horrific abuses 
of well-established human rights.  Perhaps the broadest possible scope for
extraterritoriality should, where realistically necessary, be traded off unless 
and until the results from that concession involve what human rights 
advocates and others consider a sheer travesty, whatever the negotiated 
compensations in other respects.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article raised, and roughly prioritized from a human rights advocate’s 
standpoint, a number of contentious and perhaps theoretically unresolvable 
issues. Assuming actual or hypothetical negotiation involving such issues, 
this Article seeks to identify where concessions can best be made for the 
sake of more crucial human rights priorities, with an eye toward avoiding
what some have called moral or jurisprudential travesty, including broad 
and conspicuous corporate impunity in the most grievous and otherwise 
vital cases.
Human rights advocates themselves, as well as corporate decisionmakers, 
victims, experts, officials, consumers, trade groups, and others can of course
differ as to their own sets of priorities and tradeoff rates. The broader goal 
herein is to encourage hypothetical, and eventually some forms of actual,
negotiation over such judicial matters.  Enhancing the current momentum 
toward some more genuinely meaningful human rights law regime is at 
this point a worthy aspiration.
Momentum in this respect cannot be taken for granted.  Consider, for 
example, even a tempered version of Professor Eric Posner’s recent
treaty-focused assessment: “Human rights law has failed to accomplish its 
objectives.  More precisely, there is little evidence that human rights treaties, 
on the whole, have improved the well-being of people, or even resulted in
respect for the rights in those treaties.”159  There is, however, no reason to
 159. ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (2014). Professor
Posner goes on to note problems of blatant, generalized, routine non-compliance and the 
inefficacy of legal institutions and infrastructure. See id. at 71–72.  For a recent loosely
parallel example involving the purportedly binding and unappealable ruling of the
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assume that meaningful progress cannot be made on the treaty, customary,
and statutory law fronts if circumstances are properly analyzed and
appropriate corporate behaviors are incentivized.  Certainly there is no 
reason in particular to assume that major transnational corporate actors
must be indifferent to their global human rights image, or that they cannot
realistically be induced to be more sensitive in this respect.160 
International Court of Justice, see Bruno Waterfield, UN Orders Japan to Halt Whaling in 
the Arctic, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 31, 2014, 12:47 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/asia/japan/10734305/UN-orders-Japan-to-halt-whaling-in-the-Antarctic.html; 
see also, Reuters, Japan to Resume Antarctic Whale Hunt Despite ICJ Ruling, TELEGRAPH 
(Nov. 28, 2015, 9:52 AM),  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/12022369/ 
Japan-to-resume-Antarctic-whale-hunt-despite-ICJ-ruling.html. 
160. For a brief account of a portion of the distinctive Benetton corporate social 
marketing story, see Edward Boches, Three Ways to Look at Benetton: The Cause, The 
Creative, The Controversy, CREATIVITY UNBOUND (Nov. 22, 2011), http://edwardboches.com/ 
three-ways-to-look-at-benetton-the-cause-the-creative-the-controversy [https://perma.cc/
JL7M-M9S7], along with Tanya Talaga, Benetton to Pay $1.1 Million to Survivors of 
Bangladeshi Factory Collapse, STAR (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/world/ 
2015/04/17/benetton-to-pay-11-million-to-survivors-of-bangladeshi-factory-collapse.html
[https://perma.cc/RC5V-MTK2 ] (referring to Benetton’s survivors’ fund contribution 
regarding the Rana Plaza garment factory collapse on April 24, 2013, in which 1,129 people
typically earning perhaps a dollar a day were killed).  In another multinational corporate
image context, see the summary of developments involving the Nike Corporation in Max 
Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUS. INSIDER (May 9, 2013, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweatshop-problem-2013-5 [https://
perma.cc/V83Y-BYRU] (noting Nike’s outsourcing-based and thereby production cost-
cutting business plan).
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